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SANTOPIETRO V. HOWELL’S MISSTEP AND THE 
NEED TO CORRECT THE PREVENTABLE 
ADVERSE IMPACT OF VENDOR LICENSING 
LAWS ON STREET PERFORMERS’ EXPRESSIVE 
CONDUCT 
Stephen A. Touchton 
Street performers and artists who engage in expressive activity in tra-
ditional public fora are often adversely impacted by the enforcement of ven-
dor licensing laws. Cited, arrested, or negatively impacted in other ways for 
selling their goods or services, street performers and artists have brought 
First Amendment challenges to the enforcement of these laws against them. 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Santopietro v. Howell and the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in Bery v. City of New York demonstrate how courts’ varied 
approaches to these challenges have led to inconsistent results. 
This Comment first discusses why and how local governments should 
directly address the problems vendor licensing laws are aimed at curing, but 
in a manner that does not negatively impact the valuable expressive activity 
of street performers. This Comment then critiques the Ninth Circuit’s ap-
proach to the First Amendment issue in Santopietro, primarily by compari-
son with the Second Circuit’s approach in Bery, and concludes that the Ninth 
Circuit improperly denied the street performer’s motion for summary judg-
ment on that issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 J.D. candidate 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Across the United States, street performers and artists engage in ex-
pressive activity on public sidewalks, in public parks, and in other public 
spaces.1  Their activities, which are indisputably protected under the First 
Amendment’s free speech guarantee,2 run the gamut from balloon artists to 
human statues,3 jugglers, musicians, painters, sculptors, and more.4 
At the same time, local governments across the country are implement-
ing vendor permitting and licensing schemes.5  Such laws may fine or jail 
peddlers, solicitors, temporary stores, and the like if they offer their goods or 
services in public without first procuring a license from the government.6  
Although these vendor laws are not solely or explicitly aimed at street per-
formers, street performers have been cited and arrested for violations of these 
                                                          
 1  See, e.g., Santopietro v. Howell, 857 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 2017) (Las Vegas Strip); 
Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 2009) (Seattle park and entertainment 
complex); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1996) (New York sidewalk); Peck 
v. City of Boston, 750 F. Supp. 2d 308, 310 (D. Mass. 2010) (area outside of a Boston hall which 
is located on publicly owned property).  
2. Peck, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (“There is no dispute that artistic expression, including acts 
by street performers, falls within the protection of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee.”). 
3. A human statute, or “living statue,” is a “street entertainer who poses as a statue, in real-
istic make-up and costume, typically remaining immobile for very long periods of time.” Living 
Statue, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/living_statue 
[http://perma.cc/4X4Y-TYMJ].  
4. See, e.g., Berger, 569 F.3d at 1035 (“About a year after the Rules were promulgated, 
Michael Berger, a balloon artist and Seattle street performer, filed the complaint that gives rise to 
this appeal.”); Bery, 97 F.3d at691 (artists such as painters, photographers, and sculptors); Harman 
v. Santa Cruz, 261 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The Pacific Avenue sidewalks are 
characteristically busy with a variety of street performers, including musicians, dancers, activists, 
poets, clowns, magicians, jugglers, and acrobats, among others.”); Peck, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 310 
(“Plaintiff Peck is a resident of Florida who makes his living as a street performer . . . .  Peck has 
performed in over twenty different countries and has worked as an acrobat, magician, escape artist, 
balloon twister and human statue.”).  
5. See generally Santopietro, 857 F.3d 980 (discussing CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES tit. 6, § 56.030 (1989)); Bery, 97 F.3d 689 (discussing N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 20-452 
et seq. (2018)). 
6. See, e.g., Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 986 n.3 (discussing CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES tit. 6, § 56.030 (1989)); Bery, 97 F.3d at 692 (discussing N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 20-
452 (2018)).  
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laws.7  Thus, there is some tension between vendor permitting and licensing 
schemes that constrain street performance activities at the municipal level 
and the First Amendment protections afforded to street performance activi-
ties at the constitutional level.  Unfortunately, federal courts’ analyses of al-
leged First Amendment violations stemming from the enforcement of local 
vendor laws—challenges brought by, among others, artists and street per-
formers—have not been uniform.8   
For example, in Santopietro v. Howell, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a street per-
former’s arrest for allegedly violating a vendor permitting law in Las Vegas.9  
Pursuant to Santopietro, it may not be a First Amendment violation to arrest 
a street performer who is charging customers for a photograph on a side-
walk.10  According to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the street performer’s “de-
mand” for payment could mean that the street performer is engaged in activ-
ity unprotected by the First Amendment:  conducting business without a 
permit.11 
                                                          
7. See infra Parts II.B, III.  
8. See infra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.  
9. See generally Santopietro, 857 F.3d 980.  
10. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 993 (“[A] reasonable jury could conclude that Santopietro 
made a ‘demand’ rather than a polite request.  If determined to be sufficiently assertive or forceful, 
and also to link directly to monetary payment, such a quid-pro-quo demand could fall outside pro-
tected noncommercial First Amendment activity and support the validity of the arrest based on 
Santopietro’s actions alone.”).  Put differently, a “demand” for payment from a street performer 
means that the street performance is contingent upon receiving money.  To distinguish the two 
terms, “request” means to “ask for” and “demand” means to “require.”  The Ninth Circuit fails to 
explain the legal significance of the politeness of a “request” for payment, if there is any.  
11. Id. at 994 (“The license requirement imposed on Santopietro’s alleged communication 
of an offer for the sale of goods or services, see Clark Cty. Mun. Code § 6.56.010–030, may be a 
valid regulation of commercial speech.”); see also id. at 992 (“The heart of the parties’ disagree-
ment is whether Santopietro engaged only in street performance or also in regulable commercial 
activity.”).  Under Santopietro, then, a line between fully-protected noncommercial expressive ac-
tivity and less-protected commercial speech is drawn between requests for payment and demands 
for payment.  Put differently, if there is (1) a demand, (2) linked to monetary payment, (3) that is 
sufficiently assertive or forceful, arrest of street performers based on violation of an otherwise valid 
vendor licensing scheme is acceptable.  Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit does not suggest a test 
for determining whether a demand is “sufficiently assertive or forceful” to satisfy the third prong 
of this test.  Nor does the Ninth Circuit explain its employment of the open-ended word “could” 
when it states that activity satisfying the three prongs of this test “could fall outside protected non-
commercial First Amendment activity.”  Id. at 993.  Thus, activity satisfying this three-part test 
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In Bery v. City of New York, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit similarly addressed the constitutionality of a vendor permit-
ting scheme in New York.12  Pursuant to Bery, it is a First Amendment vio-
lation to arrest an artist for selling or offering for sale a piece of visual art—
such as a photograph—on a sidewalk.13  According to the Second Circuit’s 
analysis, the artist is still engaged in constitutionally-protected expressive 
activity when payment is required rather than merely requested.14 
This Comment explores why the Santopietro and Bery courts answered 
the same question, based on similar facts, so differently.15  Further, it ex-
plains why it was incorrect for the Ninth Circuit to conclude that San-
topietro’s street performance activity was fully protected under the First 
Amendment only if she requested—rather than demanded—payment for her 
goods or services as a street performer.  Understanding where the line be-
tween lawful expressive activity and unlawful business activity is or should 
be, and correcting any unnecessary adverse impact of vendor licensing laws 
on street performers’ expressive conduct, should be done not just for the ben-
efit of street performers.  These issues also impact the public that benefits 
from street performance activities, law enforcement officers setting policing 
priorities and enforcing ordinances against street performers, lawmakers 
drafting ordinances that may or will reach expressive activities in public 
spaces, and the judiciary, whose resources are demanded when there is a 
clash between vendor laws and those engaged in expressive activity in public 
fora. 
                                                          
could or could not be considered fully-protected First Amendment activity within the Ninth Circuit, 
but it is unclear when exactly it will or will not be.  
12. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 691.  
13. See id. at 691 (“The individual artists have been arrested, threatened with arrest or har-
assed by law enforcement officials for attempting to display and sell their creations in public spaces 
in the City without a general vendors license.”); id. at 698 (“[T]he City’s requirement that appel-
lants be licensed in order to sell their artwork in public spaces constitutes an unconstitutional in-
fringement of their First Amendment rights.”); see generally People v. Bissinger, 163 Misc. 2d 667 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994).  
14. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 698.  
15. See Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 987 (“Our principal question, then, is whether it is consti-
tutionally permissible under the First Amendment to require that a person hold a business license 
to conduct the activities in which Santopietro was engaged at the time of her arrest.”); Bery, 97 
F.3d at 695 (“The City argues that appellants’ ‘expression’ allegedly impinged by the Regulation 
is not in fact their art, but their peddling of the art. . . .  The City further argues that appellants are 
free to display their artwork publicly without a license, they simply cannot sell it.”).  
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Part II of this Comment is an overview of relevant laws, specifically 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the local ordi-
nances at issue in Santopietro and Bery.  Part III outlines the factual and 
procedural background of Santopietro, which is the focal point of this Com-
ment.  It also provides the factual and procedural background of Bery, which 
is the primary case from which this Comment draws its critique of certain 
aspects of the Santopietro opinion.   
Part IV explains why the legal community should care about the ad-
verse impact of vendor laws on street performers, and where the Ninth Cir-
cuit went wrong in Santopietro.  It critiques Santopietro through the lens of 
Bery, particularly “whether Santopietro’s actions went beyond protected ex-
pression and moved into the realm of [regulable] business activity.”16  It ar-
gues that, despite the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit being faced with sim-
ilar facts and similar challenges to similar laws, their different analyses in 
Santopietro and Bery led to irreconcilable conclusions—and that the Second 
Circuit came to the better conclusion.   
Part V concludes that full First Amendment protection should be ex-
tended to street performers such as Santopietro even if the street performers 
demand payment rather than “polite[ly] request” voluntary tips for their ex-
pressive goods or services.17  Thus, after subjecting the vendor law to a rea-
sonable time, place, or manner analysis, the Ninth Circuit should have re-
versed the District of Nevada’s denial of Santopietro’s cross-motion for 
summary judgment on First Amendment grounds.  That would have been the 
correct outcome because (1) the nature of Santopietro’s statements regarding 
payment should have no bearing on whether her conduct fell within the scope 
of protected noncommercial First Amendment activity, and (2) the vendor 
law at issue was neither sufficiently narrowly tailored, nor did it leave open 
ample alternative methods for communication.18 
                                                          
16. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 988.  
17. Id. at 993.  
18. Id. at 992 (“The evidence presents conflicting accounts regarding . . . the nature and 
tone of the statements [Santopietro] made.”); id. at 993 (“[G]enuine disputes of fact remain as to 
. . . the nature of the statements made.”).  
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II. RELEVANT LAW 
A.  First Amendment 
1. First Amendment Protection, Generally 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to 
the individual states through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”19  “[E]xpres-
sions other than words can convey meaning or express a view,”20 so the First 
Amendment protects the right to freedom of expression—including but not 
limited to words—from being curtailed by governmental action.21 
2. First Amendment Analysis and Levels of Scrutiny 
Courts apply varying levels of scrutiny when analyzing the constitu-
tionality of restrictions on protected expression on public property.22  As dis-
cussed below, two important factors are (a) the type of public forum the ex-
pression occurs in, and (b) whether the restriction is content-based or 
content-neutral. 
                                                          
19. U.S. CONST., amend. I; Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) 
(stating that the First Amendment is “applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
20. George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and the Artist-Part I, 44 
R.I. B.J. 7, 8 (1996).  See also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (“[T]he Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of 
[protected] expression.”). 
21. There are, nonetheless, certain types of speech that are categorically excluded from 
First Amendment protection because the speech is not essential to the exposition of ideas and it 
harms the public interest in order and morality.  See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“True threats,” 
defined as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,” are 
not protected by the First Amendment.). 
22. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) 
(discussing the “‘forum based’ approach for assessing restrictions that the government seeks to 
place on the use of its property”). 
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a. Type of Forum 
To determine the level of scrutiny to which a regulation will be sub-
jected, courts must determine the type of forum the expression occurs in.23  
This approach divides public fora into three categories:  (1) traditional public 
fora; (2) designated public fora; and (3) “all remaining public property.”24 
The first category—the traditional public forum—is government prop-
erty “that has traditionally been available for public expression.”25  Tradi-
tional public fora, such as streets, parks, and sidewalks, have long been con-
sidered important to the public’s freedom of expression.26  In such places, 
“the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circum-
scribed”27 and regulation of expressive activity is “subject to the highest 
scrutiny.”28 
The second category—the designated public forum—is government 
property that “the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of 
the public.”29  An example of a designated public forum is a community 
meeting room.  The government is not required to “indefinitely retain the 
open character” of designated public fora but “as long as it does so it is bound 
by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”30 
                                                          
23. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 
(1985)). 
24. Id. at 678–79. 
25. Id.  
26. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of streets and 
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.  Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been 
a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”); Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 
F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (footnotes omitted) (“The protections afforded by the First Amend-
ment are nowhere stronger than in streets and parks.”); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 676 (describing 
“public streets” as “the quintessential public fora” where regulation can only be sustained if “nar-
rowly tailored to support a compelling state interest”).  
27. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  
28. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678. 
29. Id. at 678–79.  
30. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
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Unlike the first two categories of state-owned property, the third cate-
gory of property is that which has never been considered a public forum for 
protected expression, whether by “tradition” or by “designation.”31  An ex-
ample is an interschool mail system intended to facilitate internal communi-
cations to teachers regarding school-related matters that, neither by policy 
nor practice, has been opened “for indiscriminate use by the general pub-
lic.”32  Limitations on expressive activity conducted on this category of prop-
erty need to survive a much more limited review than the first two categories 
of public fora.33  Essentially, the challenged regulation need only be “reason-
able.”34  More specifically, “as long as the regulation is not an effort to sup-
press the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view[,]” 
it will survive.35  Additionally, “the First Amendment does not guarantee 
access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the govern-
ment.”36 
b. Content-Based or Content-Neutral Restriction 
To determine the level of scrutiny that applies to a regulation, courts 
also look to whether the restriction on expression is content-based or content-
neutral.37  Content-based laws, which “target speech based on its communi-
cative content[,] . . . are presumptively unconstitutional.”38  For instance, the 
                                                          
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 46–47.  
33. Id. at 46.  
34. Lee, 505 U.S. at 679.  
35. Id.  
36. U. S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).  
37. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–27.  
38. Id. at 2226; United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“It 
is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”).  See 
also Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (content-based laws are those that 
“restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content”); Reed, 135 
S. Ct. at 2229 (“Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially 
content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress 
disfavored speech.”).  Reed elaborates on the meaning of “content-based”:  “Government regulation 
of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the 
idea or message expressed.  This commonsense meaning of the phrase ‘content based’ requires a 
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Ninth Circuit concluded in Berger v. City of Seattle that an ordinance was 
“content-based by its very terms” because it “specifically restrict[ed] street 
performers from communicating a particular set of messages—requests for 
donations, such as ‘I’d like you to give me some money if you enjoyed my 
performance.’”39  In order for the state to enforce a content-based exclusion 
in either a traditional public forum or designated public forum, “it must show 
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it 
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”40  “Narrowly drawn” means that the 
state must choose “the least restrictive means to further the articulated inter-
est.”41 
There is also “a separate and additional category of laws that, though 
facially content[-]neutral, will be considered content-based regulations of 
speech.”42  These are “laws that cannot be ‘justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech,’ or that were adopted by the government 
‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.’  Those 
laws, like those that are content[-]based on their face, must also satisfy strict 
scrutiny.”43  They must “serve a compelling state interest and [be] narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end.”44  Since “strict scrutiny applies either when a law 
is content[-]based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the 
law are content[-]based, a court must evaluate each question before it con-
cludes that the law is content[-]neutral and thus subject to a lower level of 
scrutiny.”45 
                                                          
court to consider whether a regulation of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the mes-
sage a speaker conveys.  Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regu-
lated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by 
its function or purpose.  Both are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, 
therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 2227.  
39. Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009).  
40. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). 
41. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).  
42. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.  
43. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).  
44. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 461).  
45. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. 
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Content-neutral laws are subject to lesser scrutiny.46  In order for the 
state to enforce a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, or manner47 
of expression in either a traditional public forum or a designated public fo-
rum, the regulation must be (1) “narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest,” and (2) “leave open ample alternative channels of com-
munication.”48  Courts ask “whether a law is content[-]neutral on its face 
before turning to the law’s justification or purpose” because “an innocuous 
justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is 
content neutral.”49 
3. First Amendment Protection for Entertainment and Street 
Performance Activities 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that entertainment, including 
live performances of musical and dramatic works, is protected by the First 
Amendment.50  One commentator suggests that “the values underlying free 
speech would appear to apply with special force to art and artists” because  
“[t]he paramount value is the significance of individual self-expression as an 
aspect of liberty.”51  Indeed, “[t]here is no dispute that artistic expression, 
including acts by street performers, falls within the protection of the First 
                                                          
46. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 
288, 295 (1984)). 
47. Berger, 569 F.3d at 1035–36.  The “time, place or manner” doctrine allows the govern-
ment to “regulate the time, place, and manner of the expressive activity, so long as such restrictions 
are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave 
open ample alternatives for communication.”  Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992).  “[A] 
time, place or manner restriction on First Amendment activity may not ‘burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’”  Grossman v. City of 
Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).  See also Peck v. 
City of Boston, 750 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313 (D. Mass. 2010).  
48. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing U.S. Postal Serv., 453 U.S. at 132; Consol. 
Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 535–36; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).  
49. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. 
50. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).  
51. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 679 (Aspen 
Pub., 5th ed. 2007).  
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Amendment’s free speech guarantee.”52  Although street performance activ-
ities in traditional public fora such as parks and sidewalks are protected ex-
pressive activity under the First Amendment, such activities may be subject 
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.53 
For First Amendment purposes, any distinction between so-called 
highbrow or lowbrow art and entertainment is not determinative of the level 
of protection given.54  The Supreme Court illustrated this point in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association: 
Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually 
edifying than playing Mortal Kombat.  But these cultural and in-
tellectual differences are not constitutional ones.  Crudely violent 
video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines 
are no less forms of speech than The Divine Comedy, and re-
strictions upon them must survive strict scrutiny . . . .55 
4.  Solicitation of Tips, Sales, and the First Amendment 
The Supreme Court recognizes solicitation as a First Amendment-pro-
tected form of speech.56  The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “the solicita-
tion of tips is ‘entitled to the same constitutional protections as traditional 
                                                          
52. Peck, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (emphasis added); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 
431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (stating that the Court’s “cases have never suggested that expression 
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters . . . is not entitled to full 
First Amendment protection”).  
53. See Berger v. City of Seattle, 512 F.3d 582, 592 (9th Cir. 2009).  The governmental 
interest in regulating street performance activities may be, for example, prevention of excessive 
foot-traffic congestion or noise.  See, e.g., id. (discussing concerns about “safety and convenience” 
of the public stemming from complaints about, among other things, performers blocking access or 
making noise).  
54. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.  
55. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 796 n.4 (2011).  
56. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990).  
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speech.’”57  Neither “passive” solicitation, such as putting out a hat, nor “ac-
tive” solicitation, such as verbally encouraging—but not demanding—tips, 
may be banned by municipalities within the Ninth Circuit.58 
Regarding sales, the Supreme Court has stated that “[s]peech . . . is pro-
tected even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit . . . and even 
though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contrib-
ute money.”59  Moreover, courts have found that in the context of fully-pro-
tected First Amendment expression such as paintings, tattoos, and the like, 
“because the sale of [the art] is so intertwined with the process of producing 
the [art], the sale is entitled to full constitutional protection.”60  Finally, at 
least one city has entered into a court-approved consent decree requiring, 
among other things, that it “permit the sale of expressive materials on [the 
city’s boardwalk], without a license or registration[,]” following a First 
Amendment challenge to the “Peddlers and Solicitors” provision of the city’s 
code.61 
                                                          
57. Santopietro v. Howell, 857 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting ACLU of Nev. v. 
City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2006)).  In A.C.L.U. of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 
the Ninth Circuit held that “city ordinances prohibiting solicitation and the erection of tables in a 
five-block tract of downtown Las Vegas unconstitutionally restrict free speech.”  ACLU of Nev., 
466 F.3d at 786.  In doing so, it noted “the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined 
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech” and “that without solicitation the flow of such 
information and advocacy would likely cease.”  Id. at 792 (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind 
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).  Solicitations by charitable organizations receive First 
Amendment protection extending beyond that given to “purely commercial speech.”  See Vill. of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).  Schaumberg’s holding “com-
pels the conclusion that the First Amendment also protects an individual’s right to ask for charity.”  
Blitch v. City of Slidell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 656, 664 (E.D. La. 2017).  Therefore, courts have held 
that “panhandling is [also] a protected activity under the First Amendment.”  Id. 
58. Berger, 569 F.3d at 1053.  
59. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 
(1976).  
60. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing White 
v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2007); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 
1996)). 
61. Chase v. Town of Ocean City, No. ELH-11-1771, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109959, at 
*5–7 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2015).  The consent decree followed the court’s preliminary enjoinment of 
a provision “bann[ing] all sales of artistic work on the Boardwalk by street performers and ven-
dors.”  Id. at *5–6.  Both the preliminary injunction and consent decree apply to the sale of “ex-
pressive materials,” defined as “items that have been created, written, or composed by the vendor; 
are inherently communicative; and have only nominal utility apart from their communicative 
value.”  Id. at *6.  
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B.  The Local Ordinances Challenged in Santopietro and Bery 
Under Supreme Court precedent, “[i]t is . . . well settled that municipal 
ordinances adopted under state authority constitute state action and are 
within the prohibition of the [First] [A]mendment.”62  Municipal ordinances 
regulating vendors were challenged on First Amendment grounds in both 
Santopietro and Bery.63 
1. Clark County Code § 6.56.03064 
The vendor law challenged in Santopietro was Chapter 6 of the Clark 
County Code.65  The code made it “unlawful for any person, in the unincor-
porated areas of the county to operate or conduct business as a temporary 
store, professional promoter or peddler, solicitor or canvasser without first 
having procured a license for the same.”66   
Prior to the incident that sparked the Santopietro litigation—and as a 
result of repeated arrests and citations made for street performance activi-
ties—two street performers sued the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment and other public entities and officials under the theory that such en-
forcement of the code and related ordinances violated the First 
Amendment.67  The parties settled the pre-Santopietro lawsuit.68  The settle-
ment included an Interim Stipulated Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MOU”) that (1) specified that Las Vegas Strip sidewalks and pedestrian 
                                                          
62. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).  
63. See Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 985–86; Bery, 97 F.3d at 691.  
64. CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 6, § 56.030 (1989).  
65. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 985–86. 
66. Id. at 986 n.3 (citing tit. 6, § 56.030).  
67. Id. at 985.  
68. Id.  
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bridges were traditional public fora, (2) defined “street performer,”69 (3) rec-
ognized that Berger70 found street performing to be expressive conduct pro-
tected under the First Amendment, and (4) cautioned that while street per-
forming is not a per se violation of the code, street performers in violation of 
some other code, statute, or law are not immune from prosecution due to 
their street performer statuses.71 
2.  § 20-452 et seq. of the Administrative Code of the City of New 
York 
The vendor law challenged in Bery was section 20-452 et seq. of the 
Administrative Code of the City of New York, also known as the General 
Vendors Law.72  The code “contain[ed] regulatory provisions concerning 
sale or offering for sale of non-food goods and services in public spaces in 
the City of New York.”73  The code defined “general vendor” as a “person 
who ‘hawks, peddles, sells, leases or offers to sell or lease, at retail, [] goods 
or services . . . in a public space.’”74  It effectively “bar[red] visual artists 
from exhibiting, selling or offering their work for sale in public places in 
New York City without first obtaining a general vendors license.”75 
Preceding the Bery decisions, a criminal case from the City and County 
of New York addressed the General Vendors Law in an action brought under 
                                                          
69. “Street performer” was defined as “a member of the general public who engages in any 
performing art or the playing of any musical instrument, singing or vocalizing, with or without 
musical accompaniment, and whose performance is not an official part of a sponsored event.”  Id. 
70. See generally Berger, 512 F.3d 1029.  
71. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 985.  
72. Bery, 97 F.3d at 691. 
73. Id. at 692; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, City of New York v. Bery, No. 96-1359, 
1997 WL 33557454 at *8 (cert. denied) (“Pursuant to the General Vendors Law, Admin. Code §§ 
20-452 et seq., it is unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale in a public space in the City any 
goods or services, other than exclusively written matter, without first obtaining a general vendor’s 
license.”). 
74. Bery, 97 F.3d at 692 (citing N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 20-452 (2018)).  
75. Bery, 97 F.3d at 691; see also Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Bery v. City of New 
York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-9089), 1996 WL 33664649 (stating that “vendors of 
written works were exempt from the licensing requirements, but expressive artists are not”).  
TOUCHTON2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019  11:43 AM 
2019] SANTOPIETRO V. HOWELL’S MISSTEP 57 
facts similar to those in Santopietro.76  In People v. Bissinger,77 “[D]efendant 
was arrested while taking photographs of people who paid him to do so in 
front of the painted backdrop which [D]efendant provided.  When a police 
officer asked [D]efendant how much he charged, [D]efendant reportedly said 
‘Five dollars.’  He was then arrested for[,] [among other things,] unlicensed 
general vending.”78 
Defendant averred that both his photographic compositions, as well as 
the “street performances” he engaged in to obtain “festive” combinations of 
his cut-outs and backdrops with paying customers, such as tourists, were 
protected expression.79  Assuming arguendo that his activities fell within the 
framework of the General Vendors Law, the court concluded that “neither 
[D]efendant’s photographic endeavors, nor the sale of them, are outside the 
protection of either State or Federal First Amendment protection of expres-
sion.”80  Although the Bery plaintiffs cited to Bissinger in their briefing, the 
Second Circuit’s opinion did not mention Bissinger.81  Nevertheless, Bissin-
ger lends additional support to this Comment’s position that it was incorrect 
to deny Santopietro’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the basis that 
payment may have been demanded for a street performance photograph. 
C.  First Amendment Considerations Regarding Permitting Schemes 
Because traditional public fora such as streets, parks, and sidewalks 
have long been considered important to the public’s freedom of expression, 
drafters and implementers of permitting schemes must be particularly careful 
                                                          
76. As for similarities to Bery, the Bery plaintiffs framed it this way:  “In [People v. Bis-
singer], the Criminal Court dealt with the precise issue raised in this appeal and found that an artist 
(photographer’s) First Amendment rights were violated by enforcement of New York City Admin-
istrative Code § 20-452.  In the case at bar, Appellant Harris is a photographer engaged in precisely 
the same protected activity as that discussed in Bissinger.”  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra 
note 75, at 5.  The Bery plaintiffs thus averred that a street performer staging photographs for the 
general public on the street and artists selling their art objects to the general public on the street 
should be treated in exactly the same way by the courts when a vendor law is challenged on First 
Amendment grounds.  This Comment agrees. 
77. People v. Bissinger, 163 Misc. 2d 667, 668 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994).  
78. Id.  
79. Id. at 670.  
80. Id. at 672–73.  
81. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 75 at 16; see generally Bery, 97 F.3d 689.  
TOUCHTON_MACROS VER.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019  11:43 AM 
58 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
when it comes to restricting individuals’ or small groups’ spontaneous ex-
pressive activity in such places.82  For example, if a permit is a prerequisite 
for expression, and permits take time to get filed and approved, spontaneous 
expression is restricted.83 
Prior restraints on speech are, in general, presumptively unconstitu-
tional,84 and “the term ‘prior restraint’ has been defined rather broadly, en-
compassing any attempt by a public official (including both administrative 
and judicial orders) to prevent speech in advance of its actual expression.”85  
Requiring a person to inform the government before speaking is a clear ex-
ample of a prior restraint on speech.86  Thus, “[i]n order to overcome the 
presumption of unconstitutionality, any permit scheme has a significant hur-
dle to clear.”87 
                                                          
82. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
83. Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1206 (“Both the procedural hurdle of filling out and submitting 
a written application, and the temporal hurdle of waiting for the permit to be granted may discour-
age potential speakers.”).  See Christ v. Town of Ocean City, 312 F. Supp. 3d 465, 486 (D. Md. 
2018) (discussing how Ocean City’s advance registration requirement prevents performers from 
“spontaneously walk[ing] up to the boardwalk and claim[ing] an unoccupied spot”).  Cf. Blitch, 
260 F. Supp. 3d at 671 (stating that requiring panhandlers to apply for panhandling permits during 
weekday office hours “constitutes a de facto ban on spontaneous weekend panhandling on the 
streets and sidewalks”). 
84. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints 
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”); 
In re Dan Farr Prods., 874 F.3d 590, 593 (9th Cir. 2017). 
85. Marla Brooke Tusk, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1226 (2003). 
86. In Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167 
(2002), the Supreme Court expressed its concern about restraints on “spontaneous speech.”  There 
is a “strong interest in protecting the opportunity for spontaneous expression in public fora with 
respect to individuals or small groups” but “[l]ess conclusively decided is the question whether this 
First Amendment interest in spontaneous expression is similarly strong with respect to large groups 
or mass conduct.”  Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1046 
(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. at 165–66); Ariz. Right to Life PAC v. Bayless, 
320 F.3d 1002, 1007–14 (9th Cir. 2003); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th. Cir. 
1981) (although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the constitutionality of single-
speaker and small group permitting schemes, the Ninth Circuit “and almost every other circuit to 
have considered the issue have refused to uphold registration requirements that apply to individual 
speakers or small groups in a public forum”); Berger, 569 F.3d at 1039. 
87. Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes:  Under Current Jurisprudence, What Permits Are 
Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381, 392 (2008) (internal citation omitted).  See also Berger, 569 
F.3d at 1037 (quoting Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (internal 
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III. SANTOPIETRO AND BERY 
A.  Santopietro 
As discussed in Part II.B.1, Chapter 6 of the Clark County Code made 
it “unlawful for any person . . . to operate or conduct business as a temporary 
store, professional promoter or peddler, solicitor or canvasser without first 
having procured a license for the same.”88  A lawsuit brought as a result of 
repeated arrests and citations for street performance activities was settled.89  
The settlement included an MOU specifying that street performance activity 
taking place in traditional public fora such as the Las Vegas Strip is expres-
sive conduct protected under the First Amendment.90 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police officers were subsequently trained that 
unlicensed street performance activities on the Las Vegas Strip is lawful un-
less there are “demands” for compensation.91  Moreover, “under the MOU, 
Metro officers were instructed to leave street performers alone unless there 
was a disturbance or safety issue for tourists.  Metro’s policy was to leave 
street performers alone unless they were ‘obviously breaking enforceable 
laws,’ such as battery and robbery.”92 
Michelle Santopietro is an actress who occasionally engages in street 
performances with her friend Lea Patrick as “sexy cops.”93  The nature and 
extent of their performance is not described in detail by the district or circuit 
courts, but it entails wearing “sexy” police officer costumes and posing for 
                                                          
quotation marks omitted)) (“A permitting requirement is a prior restraint on speech and therefore 
bears a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutionality.”).  
88. CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 6, § 56.030 (1989).  
89. Id.  
90. Id. 
91. Santopietro v. Howell, 857 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2017).  
92. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10, Santopietro v. Howell, 857 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 
14-16324), 2015 WL 1407075 at *10.  
93. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 984.  
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pictures with the public.94  There is no dispute that the street performers ap-
ply their creative talents by interacting with the public in their “sexy cops” 
performance personae and creating snapshots of their interactions.95 
On May 28, 2011, while performing their routine, Santopietro and Pat-
rick were approached by three plainclothes Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
officers who were patrolling the Las Vegas Strip.96  One of the officers asked 
how much a picture would cost, and Santopietro responded that she and Pat-
rick would pose for tips.97  When asked if this was acceptable, the plain-
clothes officer responded affirmatively.98  The performers then posed for a 
picture with one of the undercover police officers.99   
When the officer began moving away from the street performers after 
posing for the picture, Patrick reminded the officer that he said he would 
tip.100  The officer indicated there would be no tip.101  Next, Santopietro and 
Patrick either politely requested or non-coercively demanded that the offic-
ers delete the photo if they were not going to tip; whether it was a request or 
                                                          
94. Santopietro v. Howell, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1109 (D. Nev. 2014); Cy Ryan, Trial Or-
dered to Determine if Strip Performer’s Rights Violated, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 24, 2017, 3:27 
PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/may/24/trial-ordered-to-determine-if-strip-performers-
rig/ [http://perma.cc/WH9T-WU5E].  Since Santopietro is an actress and the Ninth Circuit states 
that she and Patrick were “presenting their ‘sexy cop’ routine,” Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 984, their 
activities potentially consist of more than posing for pictures in costume.  Because no legal distinc-
tion is made between posing for pictures in costume and doing something more, further details 
regarding the exact nature of their routine are unnecessary to understand the case.  
95. See Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 993.  As for any judgments regarding artistic appreciation 
of the performance, this quote from a New York criminal court is informative:  “Many might share 
the prosecutor’s lack of ‘artistic’ appreciation for this particular expression and/or message; many 
might disdain defendant’s ‘performance’ and ‘art’ as ‘hokey’ or ‘touristy’ or worse.  Nevertheless, 
neither defendant’s photographic endeavors, nor the sale of them, are outside the protection of ei-
ther State or Federal First Amendment protection of expression.”  People v. Bissinger, 163 Misc. 
2d 667, 672–73 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994). 
96. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 984.  
97. Id.  
98. Id.  
99. Id.  
100. Id.  
101. Id.  
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demand is disputed.102  One of the officers asked Santopietro what she was 
going to do with the camera if they did not tip, and Santopietro responded 
that she was not going to do anything with the camera.103  The officer who 
had posed for the photo then told Patrick that she could not demand a tip.104  
Patrick agreed that she could not demand a tip but reminded him that he had 
entered into a verbal agreement to tip.105   
Shortly before or after the statement about the verbal agreement to tip, 
the officer revealed his badge and Patrick was handcuffed.106  Santopietro 
was handcuffed after declaring that the officers could not arrest Patrick be-
cause Patrick had done nothing wrong.107  An officer stated that because San-
topietro and Patrick were dressed alike and “doing business together,” San-
topietro did not have to “say” anything to justify her arrest.108  Both were 
arrested for “doing business without a license in violation of Clark County 
Code § 6.56.030.”109  Santopietro’s charges were eventually dropped.110 
Santopietro brought eleven causes of action against the arresting offic-
ers.111  The causes of action included First Amendment free speech viola-
tions; Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure violations; and 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process and equal 
                                                          
102. Id. at 984. (“[E]ither Patrick or Santopietro asked Crawford to delete the photo from 
her camera if Howell was unhappy with it or, according to the Officers, if he was not going to tip.  
The parties dispute the characterization of the statement, as well as of others allegedly made by 
Patrick.  Specifically, they disagree as to whether the statements were made as polite requests or as 
‘demands’—albeit, the Officers concede, ‘non-coercive’ ones.”).  The officers did not elaborate 
regarding what exactly a “non-coercive demand” is.  In the MOU discussed supra Part II.B.1, “co-
ercive” was the term used for impermissibly aggressive conduct.  Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra 
note 92, at 5.  
103. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 984.  
104. Id.  
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. Id. at 985.  
109. Id.  
110. Id.  
111. Id.  
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protection violations.112  The arresting officers were granted summary judg-
ment because the court concluded they had probable cause to arrest San-
topietro by way of her association with Patrick.113  The court denied San-
topietro’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on her claim that her 
arrest violated her First Amendment rights.114  It concluded that “it is reason-
able for an officer to believe that tipping has become involuntary (and thus 
coerced) when a street performer reminds someone to tip, demands a tip, and 
asserts that a verbal contract exists that necessitates payment of a tip.”115 
Santopietro appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
for the officers, asserting, among other things, that she was engaged in fully-
protected First Amendment activity at the time of her arrest.116  The officers 
argued that Santopietro and Patrick were unlawfully engaging in business 
without a license.117  The Ninth Circuit framed the issue as follows:  “Our 
principal question, then, is whether it is constitutionally permissible under 
the First Amendment to require that a person hold a business license to con-
duct the activities in which Santopietro was engaged at the time of her ar-
rest.”118 
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Santopietro, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the District of Nevada erred in granting the officers 
summary judgment because “it misconceived the scope of the applicable 
First Amendment protections.”119  Because of their training, the officers 
should have known that the Clark County ordinance did not apply to San-
topietro’s conduct.120  Moreover, no reasonable officer could have inferred 
                                                          
112. Id. at 985–86.  This Comment focuses on the First Amendment issue.  
113. Santopietro, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 1111, rev’d in part, Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 986. 
114. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 986.  
115. Id.  
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 987.  
118. Id.  
119. Id.  
120. Id. at 988.  
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anything other than that the conduct was protected.121  Construing the facts 
in the light most favorable to Santopietro, no actions she took justified sum-
mary judgment for the officers.122  Her statements to the officers were, “at 
most, active solicitation of tips by a street performer . . . , an impermissible 
basis under Berger for arrest.”123 
However, regarding Santopietro’s cross-motion for summary judgment 
on First Amendment grounds, the Ninth Circuit found that the District of 
Nevada’s denial was proper because “genuine disputes of fact remain as to 
(1) which statement Santopietro made, and (2) the nature of the statements 
made.”124  The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that San-
topietro made a “demand” for a tip that was sufficient to fall outside pro-
tected noncommercial First Amendment activity and support the arrest.125 
B.  Bery 
In Bery, “individual artists engaged in painting, photography and sculp-
ture” were “arrested, threatened with arrest or harassed by law enforcement 
officials for attempting to display and sell their creations in public spaces in 
the City [of New York] without a general vendors license.”126  For example, 
Plaintiff and painter Robert Bery received approximately thirty summonses 
for violating the ordinance before finally being arrested.127  Another plaintiff 
was “a photographer who [made] his living taking pictures on the streets of 
New York” who not only “had his camera confiscated by the New York City 
                                                          
121. Id. at 993.  
122. Id. at 992.  
123. Id.  
124. Id. at 993.  
125. Id.  
126. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Christina A. 
Mathes, Bery v. New York:  Do Artists Have a First Amendment Right to Sell and Display Art in 
Public Places, 5 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 103, 105–06, 106 n.21–23 (1998).  
127. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 753 (Aspen 
Pub., 5th ed. 2007); Bruce Lambert, Neighborhood Report:  Midtown; Speak Freely:  Carry a 
Paintbrush, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/24/nyregion/neighbor-
hood-report-midtown-speak-freely-carry-a-paintbrush.html [https://perma.cc/8X3L-Q577].  
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Police” but was “arrested several times and . . . issued summonses for both 
exhibiting and taking photographs” on the street.128 
The artists and an artists’ advocacy organization filed motions for a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the General Vendors Law 
on the basis that it violated the artists’ First Amendment rights.129  “The 
[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York] ruled 
that the General Vendors Law was a content-neutral municipal ordinance of 
general application which violated neither the First nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment, although its incidental effect was to restrict the sale of art on 
the sidewalks of New York,”130  and the plaintiffs appealed.131 
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that “[t]he First Amendment 
shields more than political speech and verbal expression; its protections ex-
tend to entertainment[,] [including theater and music].”132  The City of New 
York argued that the artists’ “‘expression’ allegedly impinged by the Regu-
lation is not in fact their art, but their peddling of the art[,]” and further ar-
gued that while the artists are “free to display their artwork in public without 
a license, they simply cannot sell it.”133  The Second Circuit rejected the 
City’s argument on the basis that the sale of protected materials is also pro-
tected.134 
Furthermore, the street marketing is in fact a part of [the] art. . . . 
[The artists] believe that art should be available to the public.  An-
yone, not just the wealthy, should be able to view it and buy it.  
Artists are part of the ‘real’ world; they struggle to make a living 
                                                          
128. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4–5, Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 
1996) (No. 95-9089), 1996 WL 33664649.  
129. Bery, 97 F.3d at 691.  
130. Id. at 692–93.  
131. Id. at 691. 
132. Id. at 694.  
133. Id. at 695.  
134. Id.  
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and interact with their environments.  The sale of art in public 
places conveys these messages.135 
The appellate court went on to criticize the trial court’s lowering of the 
proffered art objects’ expressive value to that of mere “crafts”: 
The district court seems to have equated the visual expression in-
volved in these cases with the crafts of the jeweler, the potter and 
the silversmith who seek to sell their work.  While these objects 
may at times have expressive content, paintings, photographs, 
prints and sculptures, such as those appellants seek to display and 
sell in public area of the City, always communicate some idea or 
concept to those who view it, and as such are entitled to full First 
Amendment protection.136 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit held that “the City’s requirement that 
appellants be licensed in order to sell their artwork in public spaces” was “an 
unconstitutional infringement of their First Amendment rights.”137 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit has treated the Second Circuit’s Bery opin-
ion favorably.  In a pre-Santopietro case from 2010, Anderson v. City of Her-
mosa Beach,138 a tattooist brought a First Amendment challenge to a munic-
ipal ordinance in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California because the ordinance effectively banned all tattoo parlors.139  
Concluding that tattooing is not protected under the First Amendment, the 
                                                          
135. Id. at 696.  
136. Id. (citations omitted).  It is worth emphasizing that they “are entitled to full First 
Amendment protection[,]” id. (emphasis added), not the lesser protection given to commercial 
speech.  
137. Bery, 97 F.3d at 698.  Bery has been cited for the proposition that “people may, by 
creating or selling artistic objects, engage in protected speech.”  Mastrovincenzo v. City of New 
York, 435 F.3d 78, 91 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bery, 97 F.3d at 695).  However, the sellers must be 
“genuinely and primarily engaged in artistic self-expression” as opposed to “a chiefly commercial 
exercise.”  Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 91.  
138. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).  
139. Id. at 1055. 
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Central District of California granted the City’s motion for summary judg-
ment and denied the tattooist’s motion for summary judgment.140  On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit held as a matter of first impression that “tattooing is purely 
expressive activity fully protected by the First Amendment.”141  Moreover, 
the Anderson opinion also cites Bery for the proposition that artists’ sale of 
their artwork constitutes protected speech under the First Amendment.142  
Thus, the court reasoned that “the business of tattooing qualifies as purely 
expressive activity . . . and is therefore entitled to full constitutional protec-
tion . . . subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.”143 
IV. PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
A.  Why Governments Enacting Vendor Laws Should Consider the 
Adverse Impact on Street Performers 
Cities and counties may have understandable concerns that cause them 
to enact the type of vendor laws at issue in Santopietro and Bery.  Each has 
an interest in keeping public fora safe and free from congestion, especially 
destinations that attract vendors due to the presence of tourists.144  Tourists 
are a source of revenue for municipalities, vendors, street performers, and 
artists alike.145  Cities and counties also have an interest in preventing “turf 
wars” or fights between vendors, excessive noise, or harassment of tourists 
                                                          
140. Id. at 1055–58.  
141. Id. at 1055.  The court noted Anderson’s declaration that “[t]he tattoo designs that are 
applied by me are individual and unique creative works of visual art, designed by me in collabora-
tion with the person who is to receive the tattoo.”  Id. at 1057.  See also id. at 1060 (“The tattoo 
itself, the process of tattooing, and even the business of tattooing are . . . purely expressive activity 
fully protected by the First Amendment.”). 
142. Id. at 1063.  
143. Id.  
144. See, e.g., Berger v. City of Seattle, 512 F.3d 582, 592 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing con-
cerns about “safety and convenience” of the public stemming from complaints about, among other 
things, performers blocking access or making noise).  
145. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 268.810 (1993) (attributing a “progressive decline in the 
economic growth and vitality of businesses” in certain business districts to “the decrease in tourists 
and other visitors to these districts”); Peck v. City of Boston, 750 F. Supp. 2d 308, 310 (D. Mass. 
2010). (“Plaintiff Peck . . . makes his living as a street performer.”). 
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by overzealous vendors.146  As discussed in Part III.A, the Las Vegas Metro-
politan Police Department intended to prevent “disturbance[s] or safety is-
sue[s] for tourists” such as battery and robbery.147   
These concerns, however, can be addressed without implementing and 
enforcing vendor laws that are overbroad and adversely impact otherwise 
law-abiding street performers or chill their expressive activity.  Bad actors 
can be deterred and punished through enforcement of traffic ordinances, 
noise ordinances, criminal codes, health codes, and the like.  Otherwise, mu-
nicipalities permit some bad actors to spoil opportunities for all street per-
formers when the municipalities’ goals can be achieved by means that (1) 
directly address specific conduct that actually harms the public, but (2) do 
not negatively impact street performance activities that are not harmful. 
Not only are local governments able to protect their interests without 
implementing and enforcing vendor laws against otherwise law-abiding 
street performers, but both Santopietro and Bery make clear the negative im-
pact that vendor laws may have when they reach the expressive activities of 
street performers and artists.148  The most obvious is a chilling effect on ex-
pression in public fora.149  Street performers’ ability to make a living as street 
performers may be adversely impacted, as well as their creative drive.150  
Street performers may be prevented from selling their goods or services, 
                                                          
146. See, e.g., Berger, 512 F.3d at 592; Peck v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:15-CV-02070-
JAD-PAL, 2016 WL 4697339, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2016). 
147.  Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10, Santopietro v. Howell, 857 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 14-16324), 2015 WL 1407075 at *10.  
148. See supra Parts II.B, III.  
149. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 
(2d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-9089), 1996 WL 33664649 (“Some of the Appellants have been arrested 
and prosecuted for displaying their art work in violation of GVL licensing regulations.  Some of 
the Appellants would like to display their artwork, but are terrified of the threat of arrest and pros-
ecution, and they are thereby chilled from exercising their rights.”); id. at 5 (“Appellant Pascual 
believes that the constant threats and intimidations [by police officers enforcing the vendor law] 
have had a chilling effect on the exercise of his expression in public forums and have had adverse 
effects on his creativity and his ability to survive as an artist.”). 
150. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“Appellant Pascual believes that the constant threats and intimida-
tions [by police officers enforcing the vendor law] have had a chilling effect on the exercise of his 
expression in public forums and have had adverse effects on his creativity and his ability to survive 
as an artist.”).  
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fined or jailed, have cameras or other supplies confiscated or destroyed, or 
face legal battles if they choose to protect their rights in court.151 
The chilling effect of enforcing vendor laws against non-harmful street 
performers also has a negative impact on the public as well as the business 
or tourist districts where street performers tend to congregate.  The public’s 
ability to personally engage with these artists on an average day is at worst 
stripped away entirely, or at least limited.  Additionally, the aesthetic envi-
ronment of public spaces, including tourist destinations known for their 
street performers, is dulled when municipalities target or otherwise chill 
street performance activities.152  For all these reasons, towns, cities, and 
counties enacting or enforcing vendor laws should be mindful of the poten-
tial impact on street performers. 
B.  Where the Ninth Circuit Went Wrong in Santopietro 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Bery suggests that a different ana-
lytical path and outcome would have been prudent in Santopietro.  First, this 
section discusses how Santopietro and Bery had similar facts, and similar 
challenges to similar laws.  Second, it discusses how the Ninth Circuit and 
the Second Circuit arrived at different conclusions to similar questions in 
those cases because the analyses undertaken by the courts substantially dif-
fered.  Third, this section proposes that the question of “whether San-
topietro’s action went beyond protected expression and moved into the realm 
of [regulable] business activity” was not adequately analyzed by the Ninth 
Circuit.153 
Santopietro and Bery had similar facts.154  In Santopietro, street per-
formers were subjected to adverse treatment by law enforcement officers for 
                                                          
151. See, e.g., People v. Bissinger, 163 Misc. 2d 667, 668 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994) (street 
performer arrested); id. at 669 (backdrop and camera seized from street performer). 
152. See, e.g., Harman v. City of Santa Cruz, 261 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(“The Pacific Avenue sidewalks are characteristically busy with a variety of street performers . . . 
which often results in a lively, loud, and even chaotic environment that has come to be considered 
part of ‘the Santa Cruz culture’ and something of ‘a staple of the downtown experience.’”); Chase 
v. Town of Ocean City, 825 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (D. Md. 2011) (“Street performers are among the 
boardwalk’s many attractions.  Indeed, Mayor Meehan acknowledged that street performers are 
part of the ‘experience’ that draws visitors to the boardwalk.”); Peck v. City of Boston, 750 F. Supp. 
2d 308, 310 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Boston . . . is well-known for street performers.”).  
153. Santopietro v. Howell, 857 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). 
154. See supra Part III (discussing the background of Santopietro and Bery).  
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allegedly selling their goods or services in a traditional public forum.155  In 
Bery, artists were subjected to adverse treatment by law enforcement officers 
for selling their goods or services in a traditional public forum.156 
Santopietro and Bery had similar challenges to similar laws.157  In San-
topietro, the Ninth Circuit addressed an alleged First Amendment violation 
stemming from enforcement of a county’s vendor permitting scheme.158  
There, the ordinance made it unlawful for a person to conduct business as a 
peddler, solicitor, temporary store, or the like in public spaces without first 
procuring a license to do so.159  In Bery, the Second Circuit addressed a First 
Amendment challenge to a city’s vendor permitting scheme.160  There, the 
ordinance made it unlawful for a person to sell goods or services as a peddler, 
solicitor, hawker, or the like in public spaces without first procuring a license 
to do so.161 
Different analyses led to different conclusions in Santopietro and 
Bery.162  When a permitting ordinance is challenged on First Amendment 
grounds, the court must first determine whether the activity is protected ex-
pression under the First Amendment.163  If it is protected expressive activity, 
the court then determines the level of scrutiny that applies.164  Next, the court 
determines whether the permitting ordinance survives such scrutiny.165  In 
                                                          
155. See supra Part III.A.  
156. See supra Part III.B.  
157. See supra Part II.B (discussing the ordinances challenged in Santopietro and Bery), 
Part III (discussing the procedural background of Santopietro and Bery).  
158. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 986–87.  
159. Id. at 986 n.3. (citing CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 6, § 56.030 
(1989)).  
160. Bery, 97 F.3d at 691–92. 
161. Id. at 692 (citing N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 20-452 (2018)). 
162. See supra Part III.  
163. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.2; Blitch v. City of Slidell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 656, 664 (E.D. 
La. 2017).  
164. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.2; Blitch, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 664.  
165. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.2; Blitch, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 664.  
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Santopietro, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motion 
for summary judgment on the basis that (1) a reasonable jury could conclude 
that the plaintiff demanded, rather than requested, payment for her goods or 
services in a public space, and (2) such a demand, if sufficiently assertive or 
forceful, could support the validity of her arrest because it would not be fully 
protected under the First Amendment.166  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s anal-
ysis in Santopietro ended at the threshold matter of whether the activity is 
protected expression under the First Amendment.  As a result, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not continue to the next two steps of the analysis:  determining the 
level of scrutiny and whether the ordinance overcomes that scrutiny. 
In Bery, the Second Circuit reversed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion 
for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs’ sale of their goods or 
services in public spaces was fully protected under the First Amendment.167  
Therefore, demands for payment could not support the validity of the artists’ 
arrests unless the vendor law satisfied either strict scrutiny or the reasonable 
time, place, and manner test.  The court was not compelled to determine 
which of these two levels of scrutiny the ordinance should be subjected to 
because failing under the “less restrictive yardstick” that is the reasonable 
time, place, or manner test means that the ordinance would necessarily fail 
under the more restrictive yardstick that is strict scrutiny.168  The ordinance 
did not satisfy the reasonable time, place, and manner test.169 
The Ninth Circuit erred during the first step of its analysis in San-
topietro.  The court should have held, like the Second Circuit did in Bery, 
that the street performer’s alleged attempt to sell her goods or services in a 
traditional public forum was fully protected under the First Amendment.170  
In its pre-Santopietro Anderson opinion from 2010, the Ninth Circuit cited 
Bery for the proposition that artists’ sale of their artwork constitutes pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment.171  Since it has long been settled 
that entertainment and “artistic expression, including acts by street perform-
                                                          
166. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 993. 
167. See supra Part III.B.  
168. Bery, 97 F.3d at 697.  
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 698.  
171. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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ers, fall[] within the protection of the First Amendment’s free speech guar-
antee[,]”172 and because the Ninth Circuit, in Anderson, agreed with Bery 
that artists’ sales are protected,173 the Ninth Circuit should have concluded 
that street performers’ sales are likewise protected. 
Instead, the Santopietro opinion makes the non-committal observation 
that it is “likely” that “the sale of a snapshot of a performer’s protected street 
performance is . . . protected in itself[,]” like “the sale of an artist’s paint-
ing.”174  The Ninth Circuit fails to explain why, in spite of its Anderson opin-
ion approvingly citing Bery, it is only “likely” that the sale of such a snapshot 
is fully First Amendment-protected.175  Yet, the court goes on to opine that a 
restriction on a non-expressive physical transaction of money is distinct from 
a restriction on protected expression, and that it is permissible for such a 
transaction to have an incidental effect on expression.176  Notably, the South-
ern District of New York made an “incidental effect” ruling in Bery which 
was reversed by the Second Circuit.177  This Comment will now discuss sev-
eral reasons why the Ninth Circuit’s observation about transactions does not 
justify affirming the denial of Santopietro’s partial motion for summary 
judgment.   
First and most importantly, the Ninth Circuit’s point about physical 
transactions of money should have no effect on the outcome of Santopietro’s 
case, since no physical transaction of money ever occurred between the 
“sexy cops” and the police officers.178  The court stated that the determinative 
factual dispute in the case is about statements, not the physical transaction of 
money:  “genuine disputes of fact remain as to (1) which statements San-
topietro made, and (2) the nature of the statements made.”179  Second, even 
                                                          
172. Peck v. City of Boston, 750 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313 (D. Mass. 2010).  
173. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1063.  
174. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 993.  
175. Id.  
176. Id.  
177. Bery, 97 F.3d at 693 (“incidental effect”); id. at 699 (reversing the Southern District 
of New York’s judgment); see also id. at 695–96 (rejecting the City’s argument that the sale of art 
is non-expressive conduct which is not constitutionally protected).  
178. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.  
179. Santopietro, 857 F.3d at 993.  
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if such a transaction—the exchange of money for a snapshot—did occur, it 
would be protected since the “sale” of a street performer’s snapshot is fully 
protected under the First Amendment and “the exchange of a commodity for 
money” is the definition of “sale.”180  Third, any exchange of a snapshot for 
money could not be categorized fairly as a non-expressive transaction having 
an “incidental” effect on expression because, in and of itself, “[t]he sale of 
art in public places conveys . . . messages.”181  The exchange is expression. 
Santopietro’s alleged demand for payment could not fall outside fully-
protected First Amendment activity; therefore, the Ninth Circuit should have 
subjected the vendor permitting scheme in Santopietro to a reasonable time, 
place, and manner analysis just like the vendor permitting scheme in Bery.  
Subjected to a reasonable time, place, and manner analysis, Chapter 6 of the 
Clark County Code does not pass constitutional muster under the First 
Amendment because it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored, nor does it leave 
open ample alternative methods for communication of street performances 
such as Santopietro’s “sexy cop” routine.  If the Ninth Circuit in Santopietro 
had recognized that, regarding First Amendment protection, the distinction 
between street performers’ solicitation of tips and demands for payment is a 
distinction without a difference, the court would have then found that the 
ordinance in Santopietro is not sufficiently narrowly tailored for much the 
same reason as the ordinance under scrutiny in Berger.  In Berger, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the ordinance at issue was “not sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored to meet the standard for a valid time, place, and manner regulation.”182  
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that (1) “the Center’s permitting requirement ap-
plies to individual speakers who wish to express themselves in a public fo-
rum[,]” (2) “[t]he requirement is not limited to only those performers who 
seek to attract (or who do, in fact, attract) a crowd of a sufficiently large 
size[,]” and (3) the Ninth Circuit, and “almost every other circuit to have 
considered the issue[,] [has] refused to uphold registration requirements that 
apply to individual speakers or small groups in a public forum.”183  Because 
Chapter 6 of the Clark County Code likewise applies to individual and small 
                                                          
180. Sale, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sale 
[https://perma.cc/QA4Y-VV8W].  
181. Bery, 97 F.3d at 698.  
182. Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2009).  
183. Id.  
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group street performers who do not draw sufficiently large crowds,184 it is 
not sufficiently narrowly tailored.185  Although individual vendors not en-
gaged in sales that are fully-protected by the First Amendment might be cov-
ered lawfully by Chapter 6 of the Clark County code, this Comment proposes 
that street performers’ sales are part of their fully-protected expression. 
In addition to not being sufficiently narrowly tailored, Chapter 6 of the 
Clark County Code does not leave open ample alternative methods for com-
munication of street performances such as Santopietro’s.  Like the artists in 
Bery, street performers “are interested in attracting and communicating with 
the [person] on the street” and “[t]he sidewalks of the [c]ity must be available 
for [them] to reach their public audience.”186  Similar to the plaintiff in Bis-
singer, whose street performance involved taking photos of tourists in front 
of a customized backdrop on a busy New York street, the “sights, sounds 
and atmosphere” of the “sexy cop” routine taking place on the Las Vegas 
Strip are “elements of [Santopietro’s] expression . . . a deprivation [of] which 
might be compared to depriving certain types of artists of a paint and 
brush.”187  Santopietro, no less than the artists in Bery or the plaintiff in Bis-
singer, engaged in art that is “locationally dependent or site specific.”188  As 
such, there are no ample alternative methods for communication of San-
topietro and Patrick’s “sexy cop” routine which includes the Las Vegas Strip 
                                                          
184. Nothing suggests that anyone other than the few undercover Las Vegas Metropolitan 
Police Officers were interacting with Santopietro and Patrick at the time of the incident resulting 
in their arrest.  
185. Like the struck-down ordinance in Bery, the ordinance here requires individuals and 
small groups “to inform the government of their intent to engage in expressive activity in a public 
forum, a requirement that neither [the Ninth Circuit] nor the Supreme Court has ever counte-
nanced.”  Berger, 569 F.3d at 1048. 
186. Bery, 97 F.3d at 698.  
187. Bissinger, 163 Misc. 2d at 675.  
188. Randall Bezanson & Andrew Finkelman, Trespassory Art, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 
245, 247 (2010) (discussing how artists expressing themselves through a range of methods such as 
“painting, sculpture and mosaic, music, theatre, or merely the human body” can share in common 
site-specificity that “challeng[es] our conventional ideas of location, time, ownership, and artistic 
expression” and “gives new meaning to a park bench, to a billboard, to a wall, to space itself”). See 
also Bery, 97 F.3d at 698 (“The public display and sale of artwork is a form of communication 
between the artist and the public not possible in the enclosed, separated spaces of galleries and 
museums.”). 
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atmosphere as one of its elements and is intended for Las Vegas Strip pedes-
trians.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has long held that “[a]n alternative is not 
ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the ‘intended audience.’”189 
If requiring artists in New York to be licensed to sell their art in public 
spaces is an unconstitutional infringement of their First Amendment rights, 
requiring street performers in Las Vegas to be licensed to sell their art should 
likewise be an unconstitutional infringement of their First Amendment 
rights.  Street performances are just as expressive as paintings, photographs, 
prints, and sculptures being sold on the street, and are likewise distinguisha-
ble from the crafts of the potter and the silversmith, which are more utilitar-
ian, functional, or ornamental than communicative.190  Inherent expressive-
ness in street performances and artwork is “entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.”191  Full First Amendment protection should extend to street per-
formers such as Santopietro regardless of whether the performers demand 
payment for their art, thereby selling it, rather than ask for voluntary tips. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The title “street performers” makes clear that such artists must perform 
their expressive activity on the street.  Streets are the “quintessential public 
fora”192 and therefore expressive activity occurring on the streets is “subject 
to the highest scrutiny” by courts in order to protect the First Amendment 
freedom of expression from unacceptable governmental interference.193  It 
has long been settled that entertainment and “artistic expression, including 
                                                          
189. Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 
Bery, 97 F.3d at 698 (“The sidewalks of the City must be available . . . to reach their public audi-
ence.”).  
190. Courts often group together various types of street performers and artists as being en-
gaged in expressive conduct equally protected under the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Christ v. 
Town of Ocean City, 312 F. Supp.3d 465, 476, 479, 491 (D. Md. 2018).  In Christ, the plaintiffs’ 
boardwalk performances ranged from painting among pedestrians to interacting with pedestrians 
in a gold costume.  Id. at 476.  The court treated all their activities, from drawing to miming, as 
“fully protected speech under the First Amendment and covered by [the boardwalk performing and 
vending regulation’s] definition of ‘street performer.’”  Id. at 479, 491. 
191. Bery, 97 F.3d at 696.  
192. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 676 (1992) (describ-
ing “public streets” as “the quintessential public fora” where regulation can only be sustained if 
“narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest”).  
193. Id. at 678.  
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acts by street performers, fall[] within the protection of the First Amend-
ment’s free speech guarantee.”194  Any adverse impact on street performers’ 
ability to perform on the street, therefore, weakens the core of their protected 
expressive activity.   
As discussed, vendor permitting laws have indeed had an adverse im-
pact on street performers and chipped away at the core of their expressive 
activity.  By enforcing other types of ordinances such as traffic, noise, crim-
inal, and health ordinances, local governments’ understandable concern for 
the public’s safety and well-being can be addressed without implementing 
and enforcing vendor laws in a manner that adversely impacts otherwise law-
abiding street performers and chills their expressive activity.   
Local governments and law enforcement officers are not the only ones 
creating undue problems for street performers.  As discussed in Part III.A 
and Part IV.B, the Ninth Circuit did so as well by drawing an unfair and 
unreasonable line between requests for tips and demands for payment.195  
Under the Ninth Circuit’s Santopietro rationale, on the “requests for tips” 
side is full constitutional protection;196 on the “demands for payment” side 
is something less.197  This distinction should not be outcome-determinative 
in First Amendment cases like Santopietro.  Street performers should be able 
to solicit sales as well as complete transactions without first obtaining a per-
mit from the government, just as artists are able to do.  Courts, lawmakers, 
and law enforcement officials should work toward correcting the preventable 
adverse impact of vendor licensing laws on street performers’ expressive 
conduct. 
 
                                                          
194. Peck v. City of Boston, 750 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313 (D. Mass. 2010).  
195. See supra Part III.A and Part IV.B.  
196. See Santopietro v. Howell, 857 F.3d 980, 993 (9th Cir. 2017).  
197. Id. 
